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Procedural and distributional equity
A B S T R A C T
How can the interests of extractive industries and indigenous communities in the Arctic be balanced
through benefit sharing policies? This paper analyses how the international oil consortia of Sakhalin
Energy and Exxon Neftegaz Limited (ENL) on Sakhalin Island in Russia have introduced benefit sharing
through tripartite partnerships. We demonstrate that the procedural and distributional equity of benefit
sharing depend on corporate policies, global standards, pressure from international financial institutions,
and local social movements connected in a governance generating network. Sakhalin Energy was pro-
foundly influenced by international financial institutions’ global rules related to environmental and in-
digenous people’s interests. The benefit sharing arrangement that evolved under these influences resulted
in enhanced procedural equity for indigenous people, but has not prevented conflict with and within
communities. In contrast, ENL was not significantly influenced by international financial institutions. Its
more flexible and limited benefit sharing arrangement was shaped predominantly by global corporate
policies, pressure from the regional government and the influence of Sakhalin Energy’s model. The paper
closes with policy recommendations on benefit sharing arrangements between extractive industries and
indigenous communities across Arctic states that could be further developed by the Arctic Council
Sustainable Development Working Group.
1. Introduction
Russia possesses the largest natural gas reserves in the world [1]
and eighth largest oil reserve in the world [2]. It is the most im-
portant oil and gas supplier to the European Union (EU) and intends
to significantly increase its role as an energy supplier to China [3].
Russia also is home to many isolated indigenous communities, par-
ticularly in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. These communities
must cope with the expansion of the oil and gas industry, which may
threaten traditional livelihoods based on hunting, fishing or reindeer
herding. Rapid changes in the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic raise the
question of whether the benefits of oil revenues can be shared
equitably with indigenous populations in order to allow indigenous
communities to pursue their traditional ways of life even as industry
expands.
Benefit sharing arrangements and their implementation in dif-
ferent regions of Russia are highly variable. This variation is rooted
in different modes of interaction between oil companies and
indigenous communities as well as in different legal and regulatory
frameworks in the regions. These different modes of interaction de-
pend on various factors, such as the companies’ adoption of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) standards, their internal CSR policies,
their relations with government, and factors related to the local
political, economic and social context. Ultimately, indigenous people
may or may not benefit from resource extraction. By examining two
cases in Russia, this study contributes to a better understanding of
how global and local actors are co-determining the design and im-
plementation of benefit sharing arrangements and how equitable
these arrangements are. It also offers the opportunity to make policy
recommendations for benefit sharing in the Arctic and sub-Arctic
more broadly.
This article focuses on the interaction between oil companies and
indigenous communities on Sakhalin Island, situated in the Far East
of the Russian Federation. Oil exploration on the island started in
1920; however, major reserves were discovered only in the 1990s.
Two large private, transnational oil consortia − Sakhalin-1 (with
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Exxon Neftegaz Limited (ENL) as operator) and Sakhalin-2 (with
Sakhalin Energy as operator) − started producing oil in 1999 and
continue to expand. We compare similarities and differences between
these two consortia. Both consortia involve transnational corpora-
tions and Russian companies, operating in the same local context
(Sakhalin Island) and involved in offshore oil development, in-
cluding exploration and production. We examine how the two con-
sortia developed benefit sharing arrangements with the indigenous
communities in the sub-Arctic region of Sakhalin. Benefit sharing
arrangements may consist of several elements, such as local em-
ployment, support for infrastructure, sponsorship for community
projects, resources from tax payments, and negotiated production
sharing agreements. ENL and Sakhalin Energy initiated benefit
sharing arrangements that include tripartite partnerships among the
oil companies, government and indigenous communities. These tri-
partite partnerships have been designed in different ways. The
companies also differ in how they implement global standards, af-
fecting both the procedural and distributional equity of benefit
sharing. Additionally, the Russian oil companies that participate in
the consortia make their own arrangements and contributions to
local communities.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we will provide insight
into differences in the emergence and design of the benefit sharing
arrangements implemented by ENL and Sakhalin Energy. Second, we
will assess the benefit sharing arrangements for indigenous com-
munities in terms of distributional and procedural equity and analyse
their intended and unintended consequences. Ultimately, we find
that benefit sharing varies based on transnational corporations’
(TNCs) corporate social responsibility policies and commitment to
global norms, such as respect for indigenous rights, free prior and
informed consent, stakeholder engagement, and meaningful con-
sultations with indigenous people, as well as pressure from interna-
tional lenders and transnational social movements that network en-
vironmental and indigenous groups.
2. Methodology
Fieldwork for this study was carried out in Sakhalin during
September 2013 and August 2015. Research methods included semi-
structured interviews with a range of actors and document analysis.
Interviews (63 total) were conducted in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and in
the towns and villages affected by oil extraction, including the dis-
trict centers of Poronaisk, Okha, Nogliki, and Korsakov, and the
villages of Nekrasovka, Val and Veni. Several interviews with
Sakhalin stakeholders were done in Moscow. Interviews were con-
ducted with the representatives of oil companies, including ENL (9),
Sakhalin Energy (6) and Rosneft (1). Interviews also were conducted
with representatives of state agencies (6), municipal administrations
(8), an environmental non-governmental organization (NGO)
(Sakhalin Environmental Watch (2), indigenous peoples association
(1), a scientist (1), as well as local residents including indigenous
peoples (29). (See Annex, Table 1) Separate interview guides were
developed for company representatives, government officials and
local civil society actors. Each interview lasted from 30 min to 1.5 h.
All interviews were transcribed and coded to highlight stakeholders’
views of benefit sharing arrangements, the mode of interaction be-
tween oil companies and indigenous peoples, the role of global
standards in the design, and the procedural and the distributional
equity associated with benefit sharing. Corporate documents, such as
annual reports, indigenous minorities development plans, and other
publications, and Russian federal and regional legislation have been
analysed in order to see when over-compliance occurs in order to
implement companies’ internal policies and/or requirements of the
investment banks.
3. Theoretical approach
To analyze and evaluate benefit sharing among oil companies and
indigenous people, this article applies and synthesizes several con-
cepts. First, to study the interactions of actors within a multi-level,
multi-actor global assemblage of oil production networks [4–6], we
use the concept of Governance Generating Networks (GGN) [7–10].
The GGN in this study consists of oil company networks, including
operators, investment banks, equity partners, international and local
offices, as well as state agencies at different levels and civil society
actors (primarily environmental NGOs and indigenous peoples’ as-
sociations). Interactions in these networks among actors from the
state, oil companies and civil society link the transnational and local
level. The main components of the GGN are i) the transnational
nodes of global governance design, ii) the forums of negotiation, and
iii) sites of implementation. (See Fig. 1) In the transnational nodes of
design, new global regulatory standards and guidelines for oil com-
panies are developed to ensure the sustainability of oil production
and the protection of indigenous people's rights, such as the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
the Arctic Council’s (AC) Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, the Ex-
tractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the lending
policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International
Financial Corporation (IFC), the World Bank (WB), the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Some of these standards
are recommendations and may be only declaratory, while the rules
developed by international financial institutions are strictly required
for actors seeking loans and investment. However, even declaratory
standards can be used by indigenous advocates to pressure compa-
nies to change their policies and practices.
Governance decisions are not only made in the nodes of design, but
also in “forums of negotiation” and “sites of implementation” [7]. Sites
of implementation are geographical territories where governance ar-
rangements are implemented and adapted to local circumstances. In the
context of oil production, key sites of implementation are the places of
oil exploration, extraction and transportation. In these sites, local sta-
keholders, and especially indigenous people practicing traditional ways
of life, experience the impact of oil development. These sites of im-
plementation are connected to the transnational level by forums of
negotiation where state, market and civil society actors debate the
evolution of global policies and standards related to benefit sharing and
address challenges in the implementation of benefit sharing arrange-
ments on the ground.
The concept of “fair and equitable benefit sharing” is a legal norm
related to natural resource use that is adressed in several international
conventions, including agreements focused on biodiversity, interna-
tional human rights, and the law of the sea [11,12], p. 353). The con-
cept has been developed in detail in the 2010 Nagoya Protocol, a
Fig. 1. Governance Generating Network.
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supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD),
related to the use of biological resources [13]. In the last decade,
benefit sharing agreements became a global phenomenon, especially in
case of oil and mining industries [14–17]. As revenues from oil flow far
beyond extraction sites, local indigenous people may be more or less
able to receive dividends from the “black gold” extracted from their
lands and to receive compensation for damage to the surrounding en-
vironment and natural resources. Oil companies often declare their
commitment to benefit sharing on the transnational or national levels;
however, how they negotiate and implement these commitments in
communities varies significantly [18]. Depending on the mode of in-
teraction among coalitions of actors, different discourses, rules and
resources of benefit sharing are emphasized, resulting in different
benefit sharing arrangements. Different modes of interaction between
oil companies and indigenous communities related to benefit sharing
can be distinguished, such as the shareholder mode, in which residents
of indigenous communities receive direct dividends from oil extraction;
the partnership mode, in which communities are partners in tripartite
agreements between state, company and community representatives;
the corporate social responsibility mode, in which companies imple-
ment global standards in their own terms to determine compensation;
and the paternalistic mode, in which companies assist the state by
providing in-kind support to local communities [19]. Benefits from oil
extraction are shared with local communities in different forms, such as
taxes (formal benefits), as part of partnership agreements among the
company, state and indigenous communities (semi-formal arrange-
ments), as charitable giving and sponsorship (informal arrangements),
and as trickle-down benefits, such as the construction of infrastructure
and the creation of local jobs.
The processes of benefit sharing or paying compensation deeply
implicate questions of equity. Actors disagree on how the effects of
oil development should be measured and the quantity, quality and
mechanisms of resource transfer to communities. To assess the
fairness of benefit sharing arrangements, we make use of the con-
cept of equity developed by McDermott et al. [20]. The concept of
equity allows for an assessment of benefit sharing between oil
companies and indigenous peoples by evaluating the type and dis-
tribution of social impacts of the industry. Equity in this context is
understood as the achievement of equality across some agreed upon
and negotiated social measure, although the type of measure will
vary across cases [21]. Following McDermott et al. [20], we dis-
tinguish between procedural and distributive dimensions of equity to
assess how benefit-sharing has evolved over time and whether in-
digenous communities perceive the outcomes of benefit sharing
arrangements in the oil governance network as equitable. Proce-
dural equity refers to participation in decision-making processes −
for example, who is involved in the design of benefit sharing ar-
rangements and to what extent indigenous people can participate in
its creation. Distributive equity, in contrast, encompasses the dis-
tribution of costs and benefits that local and indigenous people re-
ceive from oil production. With its focus on equity, our work is in
dialogue with the energy justice literature and its concern with
human-centred research on energy politics [22]. The energy justice
literature also has identified as basic tenets of justice the concepts of
distribution (what and where are the challenges related to energy),
recognition (who is affected), and procedure (how can problems be
resolved) [23], 175; [24]. In our analysis of equity in benefit
sharing, we highlight the outcomes of energy-company community
interaction and consider whether, once oil production is estab-
lished, is it possible to set up procedures of decision-making and
systems of resource distribution that ameliorate damage to tradi-
tional territories of indigenous use.
This paper examines how oil companies and indigenous com-
munities interact in two partnerships in Sakhalin, Russia. In our case
studies, oil companies, state and civil society networks (i.e. the oil
GGN) are linked through processes at transnational and local levels.
The actors in these networks are involved in continuous interaction
and negotiation, both within and between networks, and from the
global level nodes of design to the sites of implementation.
Throughout these scales of interaction, members of the GGN engage
in forums of negotiation, including those associated with the design
and implementation of benefit sharing standards as well as en-
vironmental and indigenous activism more broadly. We touch upon
the existing array of benefit sharing arrangements among oil com-
panies on the island and specifically analyze those that emerge from
the two partnerships. We examine how the tripartite agreements
have been influenced by global actors and global standards, and how
the distribution of allocated benefits was determined in part within
the GGN’s forums of negotiation.
4. Background: oil consortia and indigenous peoples
4.1. Oil consortia
Sakhalin-1 is one of the largest oil and gas projects in Russia,
measured by level of foreign investment. The consortium operator is
ENL, a subsidiary of the US company Exxon Mobil, which owns 30% of
the shares. The Russian company Rosneft, which entered into a stra-
tegic partnership with Exxon Mobil, is represented in the consortium
through two subsidiaries: RN-Astra (8,5%) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-
Shelf (11,5%). In addition, the consortium includes the Japanese
company SODECO (30%) and the Indian state oil company ONGC
Videsh Ltd (20%). The oil fields where Sakhalin-1 operates were dis-
covered in the 1970s, but a production sharing agreement with the
Russian federal and regional governments was concluded only in 1996.
The first commercial oil was produced in 2010. The project operates
three offshore oil fields: Chayavo (since 2005), Odoptu (since 2009/10)
and Arkutun-Dagi (since 2015). (See Appendix, Table 1)
Sakhalin-2 is a consortium led by the operator Sakhalin Energy,
headquartered in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Sakhalin Energy was founded
in 1994 by three companies − Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui Co. Ltd,
and Mitsubishi Corporation − in order to develop the Piltun-
Asokhskoye and Lunskoye oil deposits on the north eastern shelf of
Sakhalin Island. Sakhalin-2 includes the first liquefied natural gas
(LNG) plant in Russia, situated in Prigorodnoye in Aniva Bay. In
1994, Sakhalin Energy signed a production sharing agreement with
the Russian federal and regional governments. The project started
to produce its first oil in 1999, earlier then Sakhalin 1 project. In
2006, Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi signed an agreement
allowing Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas company, to enter the
consortium as the main shareholder. In 2007, Gazprom Sakhalin
Holdings B.V. bought 50,1% of the Sakhalin-2 shares, a controlling
stake. Prior to the purchase, Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V., a sub-
sidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, had owned the controlling stake, but
after Gazprom joined Shell was left with only a 27,5% share. As a
result, since 2007 Shell has not participated in decision-making
processes for the consortium, although through Sakhalin Energy
Shell had taken the lead in designing and launching the benefit
sharing agreement in 2006 [25], p. 107. In addition, the two Ja-
panese companies remain part of the consortium: Mitsui Sakhalin
Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary of Mitsui Co. Ltd, holding 12,5%) and
Diamond Gas Sakhalin (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation,
with 10%).
4.2. Indigenous people
Sakhalin is populated by approximately 3000 Nivkhi, Uilta, Nanai,
Evenk, Chukchi and Itelmens indigenous people (out of a total popu-
lation of 511,000) [[26], p. 84] living mainly around the towns of
Okha, Nogliki, Tym, Aleksandrovsk-Smirnykhovsky, Poronaisk, and
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and the villages of Val and Nekrasovka. In Sakhalin
territories of traditional nature use are not designated and regional
M. Tysiachniouk et al. Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018) 140–152
142
legislation is not developed as in other Russian regions (e.g. Khanti-
Mansiisk Autonomous region1 or Sakha Yakutia2). This means that
Sakhalin’s traditional fishing, reindeer herding and hunting grounds
have to be shared with other users to allow multiple land use and no
compensation is required on the side of the companies. An exception
are the Nivkhi fishermen, who, after the Soviet collapse, managed to
use existing legislation to officially designate fishing grounds for
themselves. The most active and influential organization of indigenous
people is the Regional Council of Authorized Representatives (Com-
missioners) of the Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin Oblast. The Council
was established in 2005 as a consequence of indigenous people’s role in
the Green Wave protests on Sakhalin [25], p. 107. The Council of Au-
thorized Representatives consists of eight members representing the
four main indigenous groups of Sakhalin (Nivkh, Uilta, Nanai, and
Evenk). The aims of the Council are to protect indigenous peoples’
rights, represent indigenous communities in their interactions with
government and oil companies, and monitor operations of oil compa-
nies and their contractors. In addition to the Council, there is the Sa-
khalin Indigenous People’s Union which unites all indigenous NGOs on
Sakhalin Island, such as Kykh–Kykh (The Swan).3,4
5. Benefit sharing: a comparative analysis
We use the GGN and equity framework together to assess whether
and why an oil production network may or may not lead benefit
sharing that is perceived as equitable. While the GGN approach maps
out decision-making dynamics at multiple scales within a governance
network, the equity framework provides a means to assess the bal-
ance of power and interests resulting from GGN dynamics. We
leverage the distinction between procedural and distributive equity
to assess on-the-ground outcomes of benefit sharing arrangements,
differentiating between outcomes involving process-based change in
the form of indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making
related to oil production and benefit sharing, and distributive out-
comes in the form of changes to the distribution of material benefits
from oil extraction. Benefit sharing arrangements may take different
forms in oil GGNs. Some benefits are determined by legislation, such
as taxes or production sharing agreements, negotiated in the early
stages of resource extraction. These formal arrangements are estab-
lished by the government and do not require constant renegotiation.
Other benefit sharing arrangements are semi-formal in character and
are negotiated at the regional and local level by actors spanning from
local to global: TNCs, national companies, the state authorities, and
beneficiaries, including local indigenous groups. The tripartite
partnership agreements in our case studies serve as examples of semi-
formal arrangements.
Both the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 GGNs are atypical for Russia
as they are characterized by international companies’ high level of
involvement in applying their CSR policies in the Russian context.
Although onshore oil development has been taking place on
Sakhalin since 1920, it was only in the 1990s offshore drilling was
undertaken by international oil consortia. The TNCs involved in
these consortia were not influenced by Soviet oil development
practices [27] or by the Soviet style of CSR that often resulted in
paternalistic benefit sharing arrangements with local communities
[18]. In contrast to Russian oil companies, transnational companies
were vulnerable to scrutiny and pressure from both transnational
and local environmental NGOs, as well as indigenous protests from
the late 1990s, peaking in the mid-2000s. These protests were di-
rected both against Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects, but mainly
affected Sakhalin-2 when public financial institutions that were
lenders and investors to the project threatened to cancel their in-
vestments in Sakhalin-2 [28]. Also, in Sakhalin-2, Shell was a re-
ceptive target [27], p. 80. Sakhalin-1 turned to be less vulnerable to
the NGO campaign as its operator ENL relied on investment funds
directly from its corporate parent Exxon Mobil. The local campaign
resulted in changes in the sites of implementation in terms of pro-
cedural and distributional equity in implementation of benefit
sharing arrangements, but had a greater effect on Sakhalin-2. Al-
though consortium operators differ in their benefit-sharing ar-
rangements, even sharper differences exist between foreign and
Russian companies active on Sakhalin.
5.1. Formal benefits in Sakhalin: Russian legislation
Russian tax legislation establishes the foundation for formal benefit
sharing in Sakhalin. Oil companies in Russia pay taxes to the federal
government (income, profit, mineral production and VAT taxes), to the
regional government (property taxes, payments to social funds, and
customs), and to local governments (transport taxes) [29]. Most of the
taxes paid by oil companies, including the mineral extraction tax (MET)
and export duties go to the federal budget, leaving a much smaller share
for the regions [30]. According to Russian legislation, the distribution
of tax revenue depends on where the company is registered. Both ENL
and Sakhalin Energy are registered in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the region’s
capital. Rosneft is represented on Sakhalin by RN Sakhalin Morneftegas
LLC; until recently this company was registered and paid its taxes in the
municipal unit of the Okhtinskiy urban district. However, after the
reorganization of the company in 2011, its office moved to Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk, and the taxes shifted to the regional budget. A local ad-
ministrator from Okha stated that the regional budget allocates money
to the municipal budget for infrastructure development instead of for
social needs.5 Therefore, the municipal government now has less dis-
cretion over how the tax income is used.
Both Sakhalin-1 (1996) and Sakhalin-2 (1994) established produc-
tion-sharing agreements (PSAs) with the Russian federal and Sakhalin
regional governments. These PSAs are quite unique in Russia, with only
one other active PSA in the Kharyaga oil field in the Nenets
Autonomous Okrug, and Sakhalin hosts the two most successful uses of
Russia’s 1990 law on production sharing agreements. A PSA provides a
special taxation arrangement in which production sharing substitutes
for the majority of tax and custom charges that would have been paid
under the traditional system. PSAs can address the imbalance between
federal and regional revenue streams, providing more financial support
at the regional level and opening up greater potential to address dis-
tributional equity. Based on these PSAs, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are
the major contributors to the Sakhalin regional budget. The Sakhalin-1
consortium contributed more than US$ 1.3 billion to the budget of
Sakhalin region [31], while the Sakhalin-2 consortium, which is larger
than Sakhalin-1, paid US$ 2.4 billion to the Sakhalin regional budget in
2015 alone [32–34].
As a result of its PSA, once oil production has started Sakhalin
Energy pays 6% of royalties to the regional state budget. After the re-
imbursement of project implementation costs, Sakhalin Energy pays
income tax at the rate of 32% and delivers a share of the production in
the form of natural gas to villages. Actual production sharing started in
2012, several months before schedule [32–34]. Thus, according to the
PSA, Sakhalin Energy pays taxes not only to the federal budget, but also
1 Regional law #145. On Territories of Traditional Nature Use of Indigenous
Numerically Small Peoples of the North in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. From 23
December 2006. Available online: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/422448755 (accessed
on 23 September 2016).
2 Regional law #145. On Territories of Traditional Nature Use of Indigenous
Numerically Small Peoples of the North in Nenets Autonomous District. From 29
December 2001. Available online: https://www.info83.ru/territorii-tradicionnogo-
prirodopolzovaniya (accessed on 23 September 2016)
3 Interview with local activist, Nekrasovka 18,08.2015.
4 Interview with the head of the Council of tribal enterprises 19.08.2015. 5 Head of local administration, Okha, 17.08.2015
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to the budget of the Sakhalin region. In 2013, the taxes of Sakhalin
Energy amounted to 60% of the Sakhalin regional budget.6 In addition,
taxes are paid not only by companies themselves, but also by their
contractors, which increases budget revenue [32–34]. The Sakhalin
government uses some tax money coming from PSA agreements to
support regional programs for indigenous peoples. Therefore, PSAs in-
directly contribute to benefit sharing by oil companies by making more
resources available at the regional and local level.
Sakhalin island also experienced trickle down benefits from the oil
industry more generally. Sakhalin-1, for example, contributed $156
million to the construction of roads in Sakhalin Oblast and Khabarovsk
Krai [31], while the Sakhalin-2 project spent over $600 million re-
pairing 50 bridges, several landfills and 200 kilometres of roads and
other infrastructure on the island [32].
5.2. Semi-Formal benefits: transnational and local influences on benefit-
sharing
Natural resource companies operating in Russia are governed by
the Russian law “On guaranteeing the rights of small numbered in-
digenous peoples of the North” [35], which allows indigenous people
to pursue their subsistence economic activities on the land free of
change, including on land licensed to oil companies. However, in-
ternational consortiums are also guided by global standards, which
foster an innovative set of benefit sharing arrangements. Global
standards especially are likely to shape benefit sharing when they
provide leverage for local actors within the GGN to pressure TNCs for
more equitable outcomes. Sakhalin Energy and ENL, the two con-
sortium operators, reference the same global standards. They have
undergone compliance certification with ISO-26000 standards,
which include worker health and safety, ecological sustainability,
energy efficiency, and other criteria.7 They also cite international
voluntary principles on security and human rights. Both companies
have the stated goal of addressing the interests of transnational and
local stakeholders as well as shareholders.8 Both companies de-
monstrate a commitment to the principles of UN Global Compact and
the ILO convention in their corporate policies. (For more detail on
global standards, see Appendix, Table 2 [36].) Sakhalin Energy is
implementing the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan
(SIMDP), a plan which incorporated standards from the IMF, World
Bank, EBRD and UNDRIP. ENL relies to a larger extent on its own
CSR policy, elaborated in their U.S. headquarters by Exxon Mobil,
which is based on the same global standards [37], but is not con-
strained by the requirements of global financial institutions as ENL
has not borrowed money from these institutions.
To protect the rights of indigenous people specifically, the compa-
nies have developed procedures in internal corporate documents that
conform to global standards and serve as decision-making guidelines.9
In these documents, both companies declare their commitment to the
ILO Convention 169 "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention", the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
[38,39], the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and the World
Bank Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples.
(See Annex, Table 2) Both consortium operators have committed to
taking into account indigenous rights as they conduct reputational,
ecological and economic risk assessments. The companies also observe
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
perform environmental impact assessments (EIA) as required by Rus-
sian and international legislation.
Involving indigenous people in the design and implementation of
benefit sharing arrangements is not required as such in any of these
global standards. Instead, several standards, such as the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights [40], the 1989 ILO Con-
vention 169 "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention", and the
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, require
consultation and recommend the use of the principle of Free Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC). The IFC interprets FPIC as an expansion of
Informed Consultation and Participation (or meaningful consultation)
[41]. When land is owned by indigenous people, the use of FPIC may
allow indigenous communities to veto oil drilling if they face reset-
tlement. More generally, FPIC calls for negotiations between compa-
nies and indigenous communities that would determine an appro-
priate compensation toward indigenous communities for land
extraction and damage.
On Sakhalin, two social movements have actively made use of
global standards to pressure TNCs through the GGN network − first, an
environmental movement concerned with the threats to the Pacific grey
whale population and damage to rivers, among other issues, and,
second, indigenous mobilization focused on disturbances to traditional
practices, such as reindeer herding and seasonal fishing. The environ-
mental movement included the Russian NGO Sakhalin Environmental
Watch, in partnership with the California-based NGO Pacific
Environment and the Russian Green Party; these groups continuously
challenged the oil industry on Sakhalin from the late 1990s and their
campaign stretched from local to global venues to target investment
banks willing to finance the second stage of the Sakhalin-2 project
[42,43]. Activists used the expertise of the CEE Bankwatch Network to
pressure financial institutions not to invest in the oil industry [44].
During the same period, indigenous activists demanded an ethnological
impact assessment to determine how local communities would be af-
fected by oil development. Even though both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2
projects supported indigenous peoples financially, leaders of the Re-
gional Association asked companies to carry out impact assessments
and pay compensation for damages, as well as to allocate funding for
indigenous peoples’ development.
The movements came together in the Green Wave protests which
culminated in January 2005 when approximately 100 people blocked
road access to several of the consortia construction sites [25], p. 106.
This primarily indigenous action was supported by some environmental
organizations which shared indigenous concerns. Environmental net-
works, including Sakhalin Environmental Watch and 146 NGOs oper-
ating in 22 countries, notably WWF, Greenpeace, Rainforest Action
Network, BANKTrack and Friends of the Earth, as well as 80 Russian
NGOs located all over Russia which had been pressuring international
financial institutions about green issues, began to make demands on
behalf of indigenous groups as well [45]. Sakhalin-2 was the primary
target of the campaign, in part because the consortium was soliciting
public financing of more than $20 billion, primarily from the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in order to expand.
Responding to pressure, Sakhalin-2 representatives helped to develop
the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan (SIMDP) which
expanded consultation with indigenous groups [46], p. 333. In this
way, the local and global activists connected across the GGN helped to
expand forums of negotiation for stakeholders and to press the TNCs for
more robust benefit-sharing arrangements with greater procedural and
distributional equity. Ultimately, these movements shaped the evolu-
tion of tripartite agreements for benefit sharing on Sakhalin, as de-
scribed below.
5.3. The tripartite agreement of Sakhalin-2
Until 2007, the Sakhalin-2 project was mainly operated by Shell and
adopted Shell’s social policies and standards [27], p.77. In the mid-
1990s, prior to the development of SIMDPs, Sakhalin Energy con-
tributed resources to indigenous people through its “Supplemental
6 PR manager of Sakhalin Energy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 12.08.2015
7 PR representative of Exxon Neftegas Limited, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 11.08.2015
8 Employee of Sakhalin Energy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 09.2013.
9 PR representative of Exxon Neftegas Limited, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 11.08.2015
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Assistance Program” by sponsoring cultural and sporting events [47].
Sakhalin Energy also created a grievance mechanism, developed as part
of its community engagement strategy in the 1990s and modified sev-
eral times in response to external reviews [26]. Initially, during the
construction phase, grievances were primarily environmental, but over
time the mechanism has become a forum of negotiation between the
company and indigenous communities. Apart from the development
plan, Sakhalin Energy has devised several social programs that serve
not only indigenous people, but all residents of Sakhalin, such as the
Fund of Social Initiatives ‘Energiya’, a competitive grant program to
support local projects led by NGOs.10
In 2005, as a direct outcome of the Green Wave protest and as a
response to the World Bank requirements, the company designed the
Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan (SIMDP), a tri-
partite partnership agreement between Sakhalin Energy, the
Sakhalin regional government, and the Regional Council of
Authorized Representatives of the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities
[46], p. 333. Each development plan covers a period of five years
and is designed by representatives from the company, regional
government, and indigenous communities. The SIMDPs were an
arrangement recommended by the EBRD [48], and their develop-
ment occurs in forums of negotiation that have offered opportunities
for greater involvement by indigenous people over time. SIMDPs
have become the main venue for the delivery of benefit sharing ar-
rangements to indigenous people by Sakhalin Energy. The SIMDP
applies to the whole territory of Sakhalin, not only to areas of oil
exploitation, and indigenous people make decisions on distribution
of funds. The indigenous settlements generally are located far from
population centres; therefore, the company created communication
centres in villages for future grantees. The development plan is
implemented by an executive board that includes two re-
presentatives from each of three partners − the company, the state
and indigenous people. Since 2016, it involves one representative of
indigenous people from each of seven municipal units. The execu-
tive board manages two programs, the Traditional Economic Ac-
tivities Support Program and the Social Development Fund. Each
program has its own managing committee or council; an expert
group offers recommendations, but the indigenous representatives
make all decisions on grant competitions.
The tripartite agreement generates direct distributional benefits for
local communities. The first SIMDP was implemented in 2006–2010
with annual financial support from the company of US$ 300,000. Its
activities were focused on social development, traditional economic
activities, and a mini-grant competition. SIMDP-2 took place from 2011
to 2015, with funding increased to US$ 312,000 annually. This second
plan included a mini-grant competition directed towards social prio-
rities including healthcare, education, cultural programs and traditional
economic activities (hunting, fishing, and foraging). The SIMDP-3
(2016–2020) allocated $320,000 [49]. In addition, since 2011 a mi-
croloan program has been implemented. A local administrator of the
Traditional Economic Activities Support Program states: “This is a
targeted financial support for the development of traditional business
activities and tribal enterprises, regardless of whether they received
support in 2015, 2014 or 2013, or not.”11; Indigenous people can re-
ceive necessary equipment for economic activities. A recipient recalls:
“We received a boat, an engine, … in 2008 we received a smoking
oven.”12; However, some grant-seekers only receive these items on their
second or third attempt.
The SIMDP also provides funding to registered communities and
organizations, while unregistered applicants can receive grants through
partner organizations, such as the Center for the Preservation and
Development of Traditional Culture Kykh–Kykh (The Swan) and a so-
cial organization of indigenous minorities of the Poronaiskiy District,
the indigenous organization “Poiran,” among others. The Social
Development Fund provides support to students (including payments
for education and accommodation) and for healthcare (such as denture
treatment, eye treatment and emergency hospitalization).13 Interna-
tional bank officials have been satisfied by evaluations of benefit-
sharing arrangement through SIMDPs. For example, in 2007, the IFC
included the outcomes of SIMDP-1 into its edition “Stakeholders En-
gagement: a Guide of Successful Practices” [33]. During the im-
plementation of SIMDP-2, the company stated that it follows the FPIC
guidelines by empowering indigenous communities and allowing them
to determine to whom grant funds are allocated. SIMDP-3 contributed
to procedural equity with the further decentralization of decision
making for grant funding to lower levels of governance. The SIMDP-3
governance scheme includes district committees with participation of
two indigenous people and one person appointed by the mayor to de-
termine how money is distributed.
Although the Russian company Gazprom participates in the
Sakhalin-2 consortium, the company has an alternative strategy for
benefit sharing. The company supports and develops infrastructure on
Sakhalin, such as roads, hospitals, bridges, airports and seaports.
However, it does not give money directly to indigenous groups, but
instead responds only to requests from government bodies. A deputy
director of the Department of Indigenous Affairs states: “We contact
Gazprom as the occasion requires. In other words, we contact them only
when we need a certain sum for certain purposes.”14;
5.4. The tripartite agreement of Sakhalin-1
The operator of Sakhalin-1, ENL, developed its tripartite part-
nership significantly later than Sakhalin Energy. The tripartite
agreement also differs in some ways from that of Sakhalin Energy.
Because ENL has not taken any loans from international banks, it was
not influenced by threats of lost investment. Instead, the Sakhalin-1
consortium came under pressure to engage in a tripartite agreement
from regional state officials who wanted more influence in grant
funding and from the perceived success of the Sakhalin-2 model. In
line with its global policy, ENL has chosen to support only regions
where it is extracting oil. Also in accordance with its corporate
standards, ENL does not work with individual indigenous families,
only with organizations. Decisions on grant recipients are made by
representatives of the company, the state and indigenous peoples
collectively, so indigenous preferences can be overridden by state
and company representatives.
During the Sakhalin-1 project’s exploration and construction per-
iods (1998–2001), and prior to the tripartite agreement, ENL paid
compensation for damages to the State Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, calculating compensation using Russian standards
developed by the Ministry of Regional Development. The calculation
for damages occurred in advance of the expected damage, in this case
for the withdrawal of 10% of reindeer pastures for construction, among
other environmental issues. Compensation was paid to the Noglikskii
District budget and was used for infrastructure improvements, and a
small part was allocated for supplies to reindeer herders [25], p.103.
However, the Sakhalin regional government continually requested
more and more money from the company, in addition to the estimated
damages, which frustrated company representatives.15 An Exxon com-
pany representative states, “In no situation do business entities have the
10 PR manager of Sakhalin Energy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 12.08.2015
11 Head of local administration, Okha, 17.08.2015
12 Indigenous person from the village of Nekrasovka, 20.08.2015
13 Head of the Center for the Peservation and Development of Traditional Culture
"Kykh-Kykh" (The Swan), head of regional council on SIM of the Sakhalin region, the
village of Nekrasovka, 10.08.2015
14 Deputy director of the Department of Indigenous Affairs, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,
11.08.2015
15 Representative of Exxon Neftegaz Limited, 05.09.2013
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right to substitute for the government in addressing socio-economic
challenges.”16;
ENL stopped paying compensation, and in 2001 began a grant
program as an alternative, allocating a fixed sum for charity and for
support of indigenous peoples’ cultural and social projects. This shift
from compensation to grants was an effort to protect the company from
the persistent demands of state agencies. Since 2001, the company has
cooperated with the Association of Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin
Oblast, and this has led to new forums of negotiation over benefits. In
2002, an Advisory Committee that included company and indigenous
representatives was created to evaluate grant applications and dis-
tribute funding. Representatives of the Sakhalin regional government
served as advisors, but decision-making authority was shared between
the company and representatives of indigenous peoples. This arrange-
ment created tension as state representatives often had strong opinions
and were not satisfied with their limited role. Moreover, when disputes
occurred over the grants, indigenous people turned to the state officials
for resolution.
This arrangement persisted for ten years until, responding to state
pressure, ENL acknowledged the necessity of a tripartite agreement
among the company, indigenous people, and the state. The inclusion of
regional government representatives in the partnership agreement les-
sened tensions and facilitated decision making on grant funding.
Finally, in 2012, the company concluded a tripartite agreement with
the Sakhalin regional government and the Regional Council of
Authorised Representatives of the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities.
Following this agreement, the three parties became equal partners on
the Advisory Committee that allocates grants, which reduced the like-
lihood of funding disputes.17 In 2013, a vice president of Exxon Nef-
tegaz announced the importance of participation by state actors,
stating: “We all recognize the leading role of the executive authorities
in providing life assurance, [and] guaranteeing the rights of indigenous
peoples.”18;
Since 2002, the ENL-sponsored grant program has supported more
than 350 projects by indigenous groups. Exxon allocates grants only in
the local territories where it operates − in Nogliki and Okha. In 2015,
the total budget for the grant programs for indigenous people amounted
to more than US$100,000.19 ENL has a fairly simple grant application
form and organizes trainings to show people how to complete the ap-
plication. The company delivers information about grant competitions
through a team of six indigenous public relations specialists, from
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and neighbouring villages (Nogliki, Val, Okha,
Nekrasovka). ENL representatives state that this grant support allows
the company to fulfil its social obligations without replacing the state in
making up for shortages in the state budget.20
Rosneft’s benefit sharing activities occur through the Sakhalin-1
consortium and are carried out by Exxon instead of RN Sakhalin
Morneftegas, the Rosneft subsidiary. Separately, Rosneft builds rela-
tions with local governments at sites where Rosneft is in charge of
operations through social and economic cooperation agreements, in-
cluding the development of infrastructure in towns and villages po-
pulated by employees and their families, and the provision of neces-
sary equipment for medical, educational and leisure organizations.
Rosneft funds sports events in Sakhalin, as well as participation of
Sakhalin children in national sport events. The representative of the
Okha Indigenous People Department stated: “This year Rosneft allo-
cated more than 3 million rubles21 to sport events; it is more than
enough.”22; However, in contrast to ENL, Rosneft provides funds only
through local and regional governments. According to one expert, it is
easier to build official and structured cooperation with foreign com-
panies, and to apply for their grants, than to develop similar agree-
ments with Russian companies.23 He states that with Russian com-
panies that lack a formal funding structure, it is more important to
build personal relations. There is less stability in relations with Ros-
neft, and funding is intermittent.
5.5. Effects in indigenous communities: benefits, conflicts, and unintended
consequences
The tripartite partnership agreements of both Sakhalin Energy and
ENL have become major forums of negotiation where indigenous people
can influence how the grant money will be spent. However, Sakhalin
Energy demonstrates much greater procedural equity than ENL, defer-
ring to the decisions of indigenous people as to whom and what should
be funded and reaching out beyond the sites of immediate oil extrac-
tion. Because of its reliance on investment from international banks,
Sakhalin Energy is subject to annual third party evaluations. In these
evaluations, international and local experts as well as indigenous
people have an opportunity to comment on how benefits are allocated
and distributed. Over time, the range and depth of consultation of the
indigenous groups has expanded. However, although indigenous com-
munities continue to request ethnological impact assessment of oil de-
velopment on native cultures, both consortia have avoided carrying out
these assessments.24 Instead, the companies perceive that they are al-
locating funding in a way that supports community development and
the revitalization of culture. Thus, while procedural equity has in-
creased generally, specific demands are not always met.
Grant funding from TNCs has assisted in the institutionalization of
social organizations, tribal communities and enterprises. Starting in the
early 2000s, many indigenous groups legally registered and began to
receive financial support. In 2015, there were 19 communities regis-
tered in Nekrasovka, 18 in Okha, 8 in Nogliki, and 23 in Poronaisk.25
Corporate funding enhances the ability of indigenous people to perform
traditional activities, and is especially helpful to older residents who do
not have alternate means of earning an income.26
Grant funding also has shaped the perceptions of indigenous people
on Sakhalin. In general, Sakhalin residents have a positive evaluation of
Sakhalin Energy because it provides funds for projects on the whole
island, rather than in certain regions.27 Indigenous representatives also
point out that the company provides funds for traditional business ac-
tivities of kinship groups, in contrast to ENL which allocates money
only to NGOs for educational, cultural and social projects that may not
be related to the economic needs of communities. Sakhalin Energy’s
Development Plan and other social programs have boosted indigenous
business ventures.28 The company funds many pressing needs on Sa-
khalin formerly undertaken by the state, but also prevents state agen-
cies and government officials from obtaining funding to pursue their
own interests.29 On the other hand, indigenous community members
also claim that the contributions of Sakhalin Energy, as well as overall
funding from oil companies, are not sufficient. An activist states, “Sa-
khalin Energy allocates only $312,000 every year, $156,000 are spent
to support tribal enterprises for traditional economic activities and the
16 Vice president of Exxon Neftegas Limited, a record of the conference «Indigenous
nations and industrial companies: cooperation, outlooks, challenges", 02.10.2013
17 PR representative of Exxon Neftegas Limited, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 07.09.2013
18 Vice president of Exxon Neftegas Limited, a record of the conference «Indigenous
nations and industrial companies: cooperation, outlooks, challenges", 02.10.2013.
19 Deputy director of the SIM department, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 11.08.2015
20 PR coordinator of Exxon Neftegas Limited, Okha, 17.08.2015
21 Approximately $48391.81 (using 10 October 2016 exchange rate)
22 Deputy director of the Indigenous People Department, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,
11.08.2015
23 PR specialist of administration, Okha, 17.08.2015
24 Member of the Regional Council of Authorized Representatives, 22.09,2013
25 Member of the Regional Council of Authorised Representatives of the Sakhalin
Indigenous Minorities, Poronaisk, 14.08.2015
26 Representative of the Administration of the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities of the
Government of the Sakhalin Region, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 09.2013.
27 Activist, Nekrasovka, 18.08.2015
28 PR manager of Sakhalin Energy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 12.08.2015
29 PR manager of Sakhalin Energy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 12.08.2015
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other $156,000 are distributed through a social development fund. This
is nothing. This money cannot compensate for the damage they cause to
the environment and culture.”30;
Sakhalin Energy’s effort to adopt a more equitable approach has
empowered local communities but also generated conflicts around the
distribution of resources. In their cooperation with Sakhalin Energy,
indigenous people are able to design the funding scheme and are in
charge of distributing grants, but this sometimes leads to disputes. For
instance, “in Nogliki there are many disputes over funding because
indigenous people allocate money to their friends and do not listen to
expert groups which leads to resentments when the committee is
changed.”31; Inevitably, some groups and communities will be more
successful than others. An expert accounts for this variation, stating,
“Somebody has already participated in these programs. He is experi-
enced. He knows all launch dates. He knows what to avoid. He knows
what reasons to use, how to make a request for a snow cat, laser cable
and so on.”32; ENL’s more limited approach to grant funding was less
likely to lead to conflict. Indigenous peoples’ perspectives on ENL’s
contribution are mixed. The grant process is seen as convenient; ap-
plications can be sent at any time, without fixed deadlines.33 At the
same time, ENL is criticized mostly due to the fact that the company
funds projects only in affected communities and not on the whole is-
land.
Benefit-sharing from the oil industry, in all its various forms,
thereby results in some unintended consequences over time, in part due
to changing perceptions related to procedural and distributional equity.
For example, indigenous people may become dependent on grant
funding. An indigenous leader comments that they “have become used
to support” and think that companies owe them something.34 De-
pendency on support from oil companies also creates conflicts. A re-
cipient states, “We start playing tricks, we try to divide sponsors be-
tween us − ‘your milking cow is ENL, and ours is Sakhalin Energy.”35;
Thus, the opportunity to receive grant support from oil companies is
both a benefit and a source of tension for many communities. Several
indigenous informants felt that, for better or for worse, the activities of
oil companies have changed livelihoods on the island so much that it is
impossible to imagine life without financial funding of the consortia.
Comments include: “Sakhalin indigenous people lapsed into idleness
when these companies came” and indigenous peoples “are now finan-
cially addicted to the resources provided by oil companies.” Here we
see that short term improvements in equity can have unintended con-
sequences in the long term.
Therefore, the impact of oil companies and their developments on
the life of indigenous people is significant, but controversial. A vil-
lage leader who works with Exxon expresses this ambivalence: “You
all know that we have already been pressed by civilization. We are
dislodged here. And if we lose all these developments, these ex-
ploitations, we will lose the source of money.”36; She continues: “It
goes without saying that indigenous people must preserve their
ethnos and traditional lifestyle irrespectively of oil companies, and
to do this they must preserve their spirituality”37; An interviewee
notes that people are trying to save what remains of cultural prac-
tices: “On Fisher’s day we organized the presentation of national and
modern clothing which was bought on oil money.”38; Traditions are
observed mostly by elderly people. A community member comments:
“In general we learn about folk art from our grandmothers. We have
plenty of national skills, we have got hand embroidery on
clothing.”39; The villages are trying to preserve their folk art prac-
tices and the knowledge of their elders in the midst of a rapidly
changing socioeconomic environment, but not always successfully.
Several informants stated that traditional culture slowly is being
transformed to a ‘souvenir’ culture as, for example, their costumes
have become brighter than tradition requires.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
Benefit sharing occurs all over the world, in numerous industrial
sectors [16]. Yet benefit sharing is especially important in Arctic and
sub-Arctic regions because of the coincidence of vast concentrations of
oil and mineral wealth, the significance of extractive industries, and the
livelihood practices of indigenous people. These industries are likely to
expand and be joined by new economic activities, such as shipping.
Benefit sharing arrangements also are highly variable, yet key institu-
tional actors such as the Arctic Council and its Sustainable Development
Working Group have not yet issued guidelines on benefit sharing. How
can the interests of both the extractive industries and indigenous
communities in the Arctic be balanced through the implementation of
benefit sharing policies? Research on this question is needed to provide
indigenous communities with models of engagement as oil and gas
development proceeds rapidly in the region.
Benefit sharing practices of consortium operators depend upon
corporate policies and standards, as well as on the involvement of
transnational investment banks and their vulnerability to social move-
ment campaigns. We have shown that Sakhalin Energy, through loans
and investments, was profoundly influenced by the global standards of
international financial institutions related to the environment and in-
digenous people. In part, this is because Sakhalin Energy was the target
of a multi-year transnational social movement campaign to raise
awareness about environmental and social issues and to pressure both
the consortium and its lenders [28,27]. Following the campaign, the
consortium adopted global standards, including FPIC, and became
subject to annual third party evaluations. The benefit sharing ar-
rangement that evolved under these conditions was relatively complex
and available to all districts populated by indigenous people. It in-
cluded the participation of indigenous people in design of the benefit
sharing arrangement through SIMDP, as well in distributing grant
funding to community groups. While indigenous people were empow-
ered through resources and through the design of SIMDPs, they were
only lightly consulted on the broader operations of the company. The
evidence suggests that Sakhalin Energy has done more to expand both
procedural and distributional equity in its form of benefit-sharing with
indigenous people. However, Sakhalin Energy’s effort to adopt a more
equitable approach had unintended consequences, including higher
levels of conflict around the distribution of money in local commu-
nities, as was described above. Exxon’s approach was less likely to lead
to conflict.
ENL depended less on loans, was not significantly influenced by
international financial institutions, and faced less social movement
pressure. Instead it was influenced by ENL’s global policies, persistent
state pressure, and the example of Sakhalin-2 partnership model. ENL’s
benefit sharing is less complex, more flexible, and more limited, as its
grant funding is available only to communities where drilling occurs. It
has been somewhat less generous, but also less prone to conflict than
benefit sharing by Sakhalin Energy. Until 2012, funding was de-
termined in a bilateral relationship between the company and
30 Activist, Nekrasovka, 18.08.2015
31 Administration of the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities of the Government of the
Sakhalin Region, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 09.2013.
32 Sakhalin State University professor, head of social assessment group in "Sakhalin
Energy", Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 08.08.2015
33 Head of the Center for the Preservation and Development of Traditional Culture
"Kykh-Kykh" (The Swan), head of regional council on SIM of the Sakhalin region, the
village of Nekrasovka, 10.08.2015
34 Representative of the Regional Council of Authorised Representatives of the
Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities, Poronaisk, 10.08.2015
35 PR representative of ENL, the village of Nekrasovka, 10.08.2015
36 PR representative of ENL, the village of Nekrasovka, 10.08.2015
37 PR representative of ENL, the village of Nekrasovka, 10.08.2015
38 Director of the community center of the village of Nekrasovka, 20.08.2015
39 Director of the community center of the village of Nekrasovka, 20.08.2015
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communities which then became tripartite under pressure from the
state and indigenous people. The tripartite framework allowed for
better coordination in the distribution of funds to indigenous people.
Thus, we see that the ENL approach and its evolution over time were
influenced by local factors, such as involvement of the state in tripartite
partnership, to a larger extent than by global factors, such as interna-
tional lenders transnational and activist campaigns. The GGNs of
Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin−2 differ in the dynamics of interaction both in
transnational spaces and sites of implementation. Ultimately, the Green
Wave campaign and its effect on Sakhalin Energy’s corporate policies
explains differences in the design and distribution of benefit sharing
arrangements between Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2.
Moreover, we see that transnational oil companies differ from
Russian companies in their benefit sharing arrangements. This leads
to the broader insight that benefit sharing arrangements depend on
the path dependent evolution of past practices, which vary widely
among TNCs of foreign origin and new TNCs of Russian origin.
Within the Sakhalin consortia, Russian companies rely to a large
extent on CSR programmes of consortium operators, on the one hand,
while on the other hand they deliver benefits to the communities in
ways that evolved from Soviet and post-Soviet practices in Russia in
which economic enterprises focus on the construction of social in-
frastructure (houses of culture, sports facilities) and sponsorship of
cultural and, most significantly, sports events. Contrary to foreign
companies, they pay less attention to procedural equity, community
participation and consultation, although indigenous informants ex-
press their desire to have similar partnership arrangements with
Russian companies.
The case of benefit sharing on Sakhalin Island suggests several
policy recommendations. The distribution of benefits from extractive
industries needs to be guided by the principles of equity and social
justice. Benefit sharing arrangements should evolve over time and
need to take into account industry effects on communities during all
phases of resource extraction as impacts vary during the phases of
exploration, construction, production and transportations of
resources, with the construction phase often having the greatest di-
rect effects. More broadly, benefit-sharing also needs to take into
account unavoidable impacts on indigenous culture and subsistence
lifestyles affected by the forced development in the region. Forums of
negotiation that allow for communication between companies and
indigenous people are crucial and provide venues for interactions to
move from protest to negotiation. Ideally, benefit sharing should
evolve from consultation to engagement with indigenous peoples so
that communities are empowered to lay the foundation for their fu-
ture economic development, thereby increasing procedural equity, in
addition to the somewhat more straightforward task of providing
greater distributional equity.
For scholars working on energy justice and indigenous rights,
benefit sharing offers an important subject for further study. In ex-
amining benefit sharing, we should look well beyond how companies
engage in simple compensation for loss of territory and livelihood to
pay greater attention to how benefit sharing may address the more
diffuse effects of energy development, including impacts on culture.
To assess these effects and study the perceptions of indigenous
community members and their visions of justice must be at the center
of any research. By conceptualizing justice in a multifaceted way and
looking beyond damages to think about possible benefits of energy
development for indigenous communities, scholars can disaggregate
resource transfer from participation and empowerment of indigenous
communities.
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Oil fields Chaevo, Odoptu, Arkutan Dagi4. Piltun-Astokhskoye (PA) oil field, Lunskoye gas field5
Global standards, adopted by
operators
Exxon Mobil −Globally ISO-26000GRI-Global Reporting Initiative6
ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries
Adopted by Sakhalin Energy for implementation on Sakhalin
ISO−260008 UN Global compact9, Sustainable Corporate
Leadership Platform (LEAD) GRI and AA1000SES standards10
ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries
• United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples• International Finance Corporation (IFC) PerformanceStandards on
Environmental and Social Sustainability
• World Bank Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous
Peoples7
• United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP)
• International Finance Corporation (IFC) PerformanceStandards on
Environmental and Social Sustainability
• World Bank Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous
Peoples
EBRD standards Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)11
Benefit sharing: formal benefits Taxes, PSA Taxes, PSA
Benefit sharing; contributions for
social courses
2002–2015-$3 mln education, health, arts (300 social initiatives) Social programs in the Sakhalin Oblast.
2001–2012−11 mln for community projects:12 health care (medical
equipment to kindergartens), civic and arts (Okha Museum, Sakhalin
chamber orckestra), employee volunteerismEducation: Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM)13 $14, 7 mln
2012–2014)14
Around $60000 in 2015 Fund for social initiatives “Energiya”-to
NGO “Korsakov Sustainable Development Partnership Council”-




2002-2015-approximately $2 million-400 projects of indigenous
people16
2006-2010 Indigenous minorities development plan (SIMDP-1)
($300000 annually) 2011–2015 SIMDP-2($312000 annually)
2016–2020 2010 SIMDP-3 ($320000 annually)17
Tri-partite partnership
governance
Advisory committee with representative of the company, indigenous
people and government
Governing Board (Company, State, Indigenous) Executive board
(Company, Spate, Indigenous) Social Development Fund (SDF)-
indigenous Traditional Activities support program(TASP)-





To organizations: projects for preserving culture, traditions, languages
(2002–2015-$2mln US)19 Education, health, arts, sports
(2002–2015—around $3 mln US)20
SDF-capacity building, health, education, culture, sports TASP-
capacity building, self-sufficiency grants, business planning, micro-
loans21
Distribution To organizations in places of operation of the company To all indigenous districts of Sakhalin Island To both organizations
and kindships-for traditional activities Equally to SDP and TASP
Community engagement Network of public relations coordinators (liaison people), working in
Okha, Nekrasovka village, Val village, Community of Nogliki, and
Sakhalin Oblast22 Meaningful consultations23
Information centres in libraries in the villages along the pipeline
Community liaison organization (two people on staff)24 Meaningful
consultations
1 Rosneft.
2 Website of the Sakhalin-1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/about_consortium.aspx, (accessed 8.11.16).
3 Website of the of Sakhalin Energy, http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/company/overview.wbp, (accessed 08.11.16).
4 Website of the Sakhalin −1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/about_phases.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
5 Website of the of Sakhalin Energy, http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/company/overview.wbp, (accessed 08.11. 16).
6 Exxon Mobil citizenship report, 2015, http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/community/corporate-citizenship-report/charts/2015-ipieca-gri-content-index?parentId=c1f2fc43-
1c09-4c34-8d85-227a1f30b773, (accessed 03.11.16).
7 Corporate citizenship report, 2015, p. 62, http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/∼/media/global/files/corporate-citizenship-report/2015_corporate_citizenship_report_full_approved-pdf.pdf,
accessed 8 November 2016.
8 http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/social_responsibility/sustainable_development.wbp, (accessed 08.11.16).
9 Website of the of Sakhalin Energy http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/media/user/article/SD_Policy.pdf. (accessed 08.11.16).
10 Website of the of Sakhalin Energy http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/social_responsibility/international_programs.wbp, (accessed 08.11.16).
11 Indigenous Minorities Development Plan (SIMDP-3), 2016, p78-82, http://simdp.com/uploads/files/SIMDP2016_ENG.pdfaccessed (accessed 08.11.16).
12 Corporate citizenship report 2012, p. 57, http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/∼/media/Global/Files/Corporate-Citizenship-Report/news_pub_ccr2012.pdf, (accessed 08.11.16).
13 Corporate citizenship report, 2015, p. 65, http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/∼/media/global/files/corporate-citizenship-report/2015_corporate_citizenship_report_full_approved-pdf.pdf,
(accessed 22.09.16).
14 Website of Sakhalin-1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/community_contributions.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
15 Website of Sakhalin Energy, http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/social_responsibility/social_programs/social_progr.wbp, (accessed 08.11.16).
16 Website of Sakhalin Energy project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/community_impn_culture.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
17 Sakhalin Indigenous minorities development plan, five year SIMDP3 (2016–2020), http://simdp.com/uploads/files/SIMDP2016_ENG.pdf, (accessed 22.09.16).
18 Sakhalin Indigenous minorities development plan, five year SIMDP3 (2016–2020), http://simdp.com/uploads/files/SIMDP2016_ENG.pdf, (accessed 22.09.16).
19 Website of Sakhalin-1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/community_impn_culture.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
20 Website of Sakhalin-1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/community_contributions.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
21 Sakhalin Indigenous minorities development plan, five year SIMDP3 (2016–2020), p. 51, http://simdp.com/uploads/files/SIMDP2016_ENG.pdf, (accessed 08.11.16).
22 Website of Sakhalin-1 project, http://www.sakhalin-1.com/Sakhalin/Russia-English/Upstream/community_impn_communications.aspx, (accessed 08.11.16).
23 See detailed description of the concept at [49].
24 Website of Sakhalin Energy project, http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/social_responsibility/pr.wbp, (accessed 08.11.16).
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